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IN RE GOLDBERG: STANDARDS FOR
IMPOSING CONCURRENT RECIPROCAL
BAR DISCIPLINE
When an attorney is sanctioned for violating a bar's disciplinary rules,
other jurisdictions where that attorney is admitted must conduct separate
adjudications in order to invoke disciplinary sanctions for the same viola-
tion.' Receiving jurisdictions generally treat the initial finding of wrong-
doing as conclusive evidence that the violation occurred.2 Where the
receiving court finds that a sanction in its jurisdiction is appropriate, it
then must independently decide the proper sanction.3 The rule in many
jurisdictions is that the second sanction must be identical to the first unless
extenuating circumstances render identical discipline clearly inappropriate
in the receiving jurisdiction.' This view is endorsed by both the American
1. The action of a state court in a disciplinary proceeding has no extraterritorial effect.
See In re Van Bever, 55 Ariz. 368, 101 P.2d 790 (1940). A disciplinary action is an in rem
action which binds the world. Full faith and credit, however, requires only that every other
jurisdiction recognize that a disbarred attorney may not practice in the state rendering the
disciplinary judgment. See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Signer, 533 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1976).
Even though attorneys are admitted to federal courts by way of state courts, they do not lose
their right to practice in federal court when they have lost their right to practice in the
underlying state court. Each federal court must decide for itself whether to discipline the
attorney. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957); 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client
§ 121 (1980 & Supp. 1983). See also In re Mackay, 298 F. Supp. 170, 171 (D. Alaska 1969)
(attorney suspended by Alaska bar does not automatically lose his right to practice in the
United States District Court for the District of Alaska).
2. See, e.g., In re Weaver, 272 Ind. 491, 399 N.E.2d 748 (1980); Annot., 81 A.L.R.3d
1281 (1977). Federal courts, however, accept the results of state disciplinary proceedings
merely as competent evidence, not as conclusive proof, of the wrongdoing. Nevertheless,
state findings are given great deference. See Wrighten v. United States, 550 F.2d 990 (4th
Cir. 1977); In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1038 (1975).
3. Even when the forum court accepts the original court's determination of the wrong-
doing as conclusive, mitigating factors may make different disciplinary action appropriate in
the forum state. See, e.g., In re Van Bever, 55 Ariz. 368, 101 P.2d 790 (1940) (lawyer may
have rehabilitated himself in the seven years between California disbarment and Arizona
disciplinary proceeding for the same activity). Furthermore, the violation in the original
jurisdiction may not be a wrong to which the same (or any) punishment is attached in the
forum state. See, e.g., In re Weiner, 530 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. 1975); Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179
So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1965); see also Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 1281 (1977).
4. See, e.g., In re Kaufman, 81 N.J. 300, 406 A.2d 972, 973 (1979); JOINT COMM. OF
PROF. DISCIPLINE OF THE APP. JUDGES' CONFERENCE AND THE ABA STANDING COMM. ON
PROF. DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS FOR LAwYERS' DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS,
at Standard 10.2 commentary (approved draft 1979) (citing state cases) [hereinafter cited as
ABA DISCIPLINARY STANDARDS]. The United States Supreme Court has found that disbar-
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Bar Association (ABA)5 and the District of Columbia.6
The Rules of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals Governing the
Bar of the District of Columbia (D.C. Bar Rules) require a member of the
District's bar who has been the subject of professional discipline elsewhere
to disclose this information to the District's Bar Counsel.7 Under the D.C.
Bar Rules, final adjudication of wrongdoing in another jurisdiction con-
clusively establishes the misconduct in the District of Columbia.' The ex-
ceptions to this rule encompass situations where due process was lacking in
the original jurisdiction9 or where there was a clear infirmity of proof
presented in the original proceeding.'" Once the misconduct is estab-
lished, the D.C. Bar Rules require the imposition of discipline identical to
that imposed by the foreign jurisdiction" unless imposition of identical
discipline would result in a grave injustice' 2 or the District Rules warrant
substantially different disciplinary measures.' 3 Additionally, the D.C. Bar
Rules would except from penalty an activity sanctioned elsewhere which
did not constitute misconduct in the District of Columbia. 14
Application of the same sanction in the reciprocal discipline situation
ment by a state bar should lead to disbarment from practice before the Court with three
exceptions: 1) where there was lack of due process in the state procedure; 2) where there was
a clear infirmity of proof at the state hearing; or 3) where disbarring the attorney because of
the state court's findings would otherwise constitute a grave injustice. Selling v. Radford,
243 U.S. 46, 51 (1916). Additionally, misconduct in one state may not constitute wrongdo-
ing in another. See Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So. 2d at 197. Moreover, misconduct in one
state may warrant substantially less discipline in another state. In re Cook, 67 Ill. 2d 26, 364
N.E.2d 86, 87 (1977). See infra notes 9-14 (discussing D.C. BAR RULES and the exceptions
set forth above); see also infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text for discussion of mitigat-
ing factors that may result in the imposition of different discipline by the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals in a reciprocal discipline situation.
5. See ABA DISCIPLINARY STANDARDS, supra note 4, at Standard 10.2 commentary.
6. See, e.g., D.C. APP. RULES GOVERNING THE BAR, Rule XI § 18(5) [hereinafter cited
as D.C. BAR RULES].
7. Id § 18(1).
8. Id. § 18(6).
9. Id § 18(5)(a) ("The procedure elsewhere was so lacking in notice or opportunity to
be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process."). See supra note 4 and accompany-
ing text.
10. D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 18(5)(b) ("There was such infirmity of proof
establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the Court could not,
consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject."). See supra note 4
and accompanying text.
11. D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 18(5).
12. Id § 18(5)(c). "The imposition of the same discipline by the Court would result in
grave injustice." Id See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
13. D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 18(5)(d). "The misconduct established warrants
substantially different discipline in this jurisdiction." Id See supra note 4 and accompany-
ing text.
14. D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 18(5)(e). "The misconduct elsewhere does not
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would appear to be a simple matter in theory, but it is not always so in
practice, as revealed by the recent case In re Goldberg.5 In Goldberg, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, faced for the first time with inter-
preting an ambiguity between two provisions of the D.C. Bar Rules,'
6
found that determining which sanction to impose in reciprocal discipline
cases involves difficult decisions regarding the purpose of attorney disci-
pline and the meaning of the term "identical discipline."' 7 In resolving the
ambiguity, the court delineated an area of judicial discretion by holding
that, under the D.C. Bar Rules, it possessed the power to decide whether a
temporary suspension could be imposed as reciprocal discipline in the Dis-
trict of Columbia concurrently with the suspension in the original adjudi-
cating jurisdiction.' 8 The Goldberg court decided that, absent additional
aggravating factors,' 9 where a member of the District of Columbia Bar is
temporarily suspended from practice in another jurisdiction and identical
discipline is indicated in the District of Columbia, the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals will impose the identical suspension retroactively, to
run concurrently with the suspension in the original forum.2"
This Note will discuss the manner in which the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals handled the question of timing reciprocal suspensions
under the D.C. Bar Rules. It will describe how the Goldberg court defined
identical suspension and proposed a general framework for determining
when courts should invoke identical suspension. This Note will conclude
with the suggestion that application of traditionally applied aggravating
and mitigating factors to reciprocal discipline can be read into the lan-
guage of Goldberg to guide the imposition of identical reciprocal
suspensions.
I. RECIPROCAL SUSPENSIONS: SHOULD THEY RUN CONCURRENTLY OR
INDEPENDENTLY?
A. Did the D. C. Bar Rules Change Past Practice?
The question of the timing of reciprocal suspensions from legal practice
has rarely been addressed by state courts. Where a state suspends an attor-
ney for violating its disciplinary code and a second state finds the imposi-
constitute misconduct in the District of Columbia." Id See supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
15. 460 A.2d 982 (D.C. 1983).
16. D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 18(5).
17. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 983. See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
18. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 983. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
20. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985.
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tion of the same suspension appropriate, reported decisions have favored
concurrent suspensions.2 The District of Columbia appears to have fol-
lowed this practice before the D.C. Bar Rules were amended to their pres-
ent form.22 The D.C. Bar Rules now require that suspension orders of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall become effective thirty days
after entry, with the exception of those orders imposing reciprocal disci-
pline.23 Until Goldberg, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals never
considered the effect of this 1978 amendment on reciprocal disciplinary
procedures.24
B. In Re Goldberg: Creating an Interpretation of Identical Reciprocal
Discipline Under the D. C. Bar Rules.
Ronald Goldberg was suspended from the practice of law for thirty days
by the Maryland Court of Appeals25 for violations of the Maryland Code
of Professional Responsibility. Goldberg violated Maryland Disciplinary
21. See, e.g., In re Kessler, 89 I11.2d 151, 433 N.E.2d 643 (1982) (sister state's imposition
of sanction persuasive of sanction's propriety, but not binding on Illinois; concurrent suspen-
sion imposed in absence of aggravating factors and presence of some mitigating factors); In
re Kauffman, 81 N.J. 300, 406 A.2d 972 (1979) (in seeking to impose identical discipline,
New Jersey court held that suspension was to run concurrently with indefinite New York
suspension; thus, attorney would be allowed to apply for reinstatement in New Jersey only
after New York court had reinstated him); Copren v. State Bar, 64 Nev. 364, 183 P.2d 833
(1947) (attorney suspended in Nevada for the remainder of the time left in his California
suspension; nonconcurrent suspension of the same length was expressly rejected); In re
Brown, 60 S.D. 628, 245 N.W. 824 (1932) (principles of comity dictated that attorney sus-
pended from practice in Wyoming be suspended for same period of time in South Dakota).
22. The only pre-1978 District of Columbia case noted was the unpublished case In re
Levanthal, No. 5-49-77 (D.C. Sept. 22, 1977). See Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 984 n.3. In
Levanthal, a reciprocal suspension was ordered to run concurrently with that in another
state. Id The Maryland Court of Appeals suspended Levanthal for six months, from
March 9, to September 9, 1977. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals originally sus-
pended Levanthal for six months nonconcurrently, the suspension to become effective im-
mediately. The court's order was issued on July 14, 1977, and the suspension was to have
run until January 14, 1978. In re Levanthal, No. 5-49-77 (D.C. July 14, 1977), 105 DAILY
WASH. L. REP. 1328-29 (July 26, 1977) (order imposing immediate suspension of six months
duration). The suspension was subsequently changed so as to run concurrently with the
Maryland suspension. In re Levanthal, No. 77-0169 (D.C. Oct. 5, 1977), 105 DAILY WASH.
L. REP. 1851 (Oct. 13, 1977) (altering suspension so as to run from Mar. 9, 1977 to Sept. 9,
1977). See Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 984 n.3; In re Dwyer, 399 A.2d 1, 11 (D.C. 1979).
23. D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 19(3) ("Except as provided in secs. 15 and 18 of
this rule, orders imposing disbarment or suspension shall be effective 30 days after entry."
Id). Section 19(3) was added to the D.C. Bar Rules in 1978. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 984.
24. The court characterized the issue as a matter of first impression. Goldberg, 460 A.2d
at 984.




Rules 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1-3), and 9-102(B)(3-4) 6 as a result of his
entrusting to a secretary work that would have been more properly per-
formed by Goldberg. Specifically, Goldberg failed to supervise his secre-
tary adequately,27 neglected his clients, allowed his client escrow account
26. The disciplinary rules in question provide in part:
DR 6-101 Failing to Act Competently.
(A). A lawyer shall not:
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
DR 7-101 Representing a Client Zealously.
(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally:
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably avail-
able means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules . . . . A lawyer
does not violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by acceding to reasonable
requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice the rights of his client,
by being punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments, by avoiding
offensive tactics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons
involved in the legal process.
(2) Fail to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client for
professional services, but he may withdraw as permitted ....
(3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course of the professional re-
lationship ....
DR 9-102 Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client.
(B) A lawyer shall:
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties
of a client coming into the possession of a lawyer and render appropriate
accounts to his client regarding them.
(4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds,
securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client
is entitled to receive.
MD. ANN. CODE, appendix F (MARYLAND CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY).
See MD. ANN. CODE Rule 1230 (MARYLAND RULES OF PROCEDURE, ch. 1200, Court Ad-
ministration) (Rule 1230 adopted the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional
Responsibility as the MARYLAND CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY).
The pertinent sections of the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY are identical to those of the MARYLAND CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
See NATIONAL CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATON,
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE (M. Proctor, director) (1980) at table I
[hereinafter cited as CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE].
27. Goldberg, 441 A.2d at 339-42. A particularly telling portion of Goldberg's testi-
mony describes the extent of his failure to supervise his secretary:
Then when I came in one day unexpectedly and I found the shades were drawn
in the office and the TV set was on Ms. Heckner's desk and the phones were all lit
up and no one was on the phones. I asked, "What the hell was going on?" It was a
work day. She said, "Well, I was trying to get caught up. I was too busy. I put all
1984l 1169
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to become overdrawn,28 and failed to promptly correct violations of disci-
plinary rules once he became aware of them.29 Because of this conduct, at
least two cases in his charge were compromised.3" Goldberg was sus-
pended from practice in Maryland for thirty days,3 m from March 25 to
April 24, 1982.32
On March 25, 1982, Goldberg's attorney properly informed the District
of Columbia Bar Counsel of Goldberg's Maryland suspension.33 Acting
according to the D.C. Bar Rules, the District of Columbia Board on Pro-
fessional Responsibility recommended disciplinary action 34 on April 12,
1982, with less than two weeks remaining in Goldberg's Maryland suspen-
sion.35 The Board found that identical reciprocal discipline consisting of a
thirty-day suspension in the District of Columbia should be imposed.36
the phones on hold so no one could call in." I said, "Let me tell you something.
Don't ever do that again."
Id at 341.
28. Goldberg's secretary failed to deposit money into the clients' escrow account.
Goldberg continued to pay out of the account, causing an overdraft. He was unaware of the
overdraft because he did not check his bank statements. When informed of the overdraft by
the bank manager, Goldberg did not restore the funds for more than a week. The bank
eventually stopped paying the checks. Id
29. Id
30. Goldberg failed to file a client's suit, even though he received a fee for supposedly
having done so. Id at 341-42. An answer in a second case was not filed, causing a decree to
be entered against Goldberg's client. Id. In each case, it was suspected that Goldberg left
the work to his secretary, who failed to do it. Id.
31. The suspension was to continue after the stated 30 days unless and until all court
costs were paid in connection with the Maryland Court of Appeals proceeding. Id. at 342-
43.
32. Brief for Respondent at 1, Goldberg, 460 A.2d 982 (D.C. 1983).
33. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 984. Attorneys admitted to the District of Columbia Bar are
required to inform the District of Columbia Bar Counsel upon being subjected to discipli-
nary action in another jurisdiction. Bar Counsel is then to obtain a copy of the order from
the other jurisdiction and file the foreign order with the clerk of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals and with the District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility.
D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 18(1). The Maryland Court of Appeals had sent a copy
of their order to the District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility. The copy
was received on Mar. 11, 1982. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 984 n.2.
34. The District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility is charged in profes-
sional discipline cases with recommending appropriate action to the court of appeals. D.C.
BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 4. The Board may recommend either dismissal, adoption of a
disciplinary sanction, or a de novo review by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 7.
35. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals made its final decision on disposition of
the Goldberg case on Mar. 30, 1983, nearly a year after the Maryland suspension had ended.
Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 982.
36. Id at 984. Section 19(3) of Rule XI of the D.C. Bar Rules requires that an order of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals imposing a suspension shall be effective 30 days
after entry, except as provided in § 15 (concerning attorneys convicted of serious crimes,
1170 [Vol. 33:1165
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Respondent Goldberg filed exceptions with the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, 37 stating that mitigating circumstances, especially the
fact that he voluntarily had refrained from practicing in the District of
Columbia during his Maryland suspension,38 made application of the pro-
posed suspension unjust.3 9 In considering Goldberg's arguments, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals initially noted that section 18(5) of
D.C. Bar Rule XI requires that identical discipline be imposed barring
certain exceptions40 not present in Goldberg's case.4 The Court of Ap-
peals held that identical discipline in this case was a thirty day suspen-
sion-one of equal length to that administered by Maryland.42
The court then turned to the question of when the suspension should
commence. Bar counsel argued that the D.C. Bar Rules required every
suspension to start thirty days after the order of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals is entered,43 while Goldberg argued that, if a suspension
were to be imposed, it should be imposed nuncpro tunc to run concurrently
with his Maryland suspension." Goldberg based his argument on the fact
that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had im-
posed a retroactive suspension to run concurrently with his Maryland sus-
pension and that the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland had not imposed any additional discipline.45
The Goldberg court examined the D.C. Bar Rules to determine whether
they required the suspension to be imposed prospectively. Section 19(3),46
which requires a thirty day delay before an order of suspension may be-
come effective, excepts section 18, the reciprocal discipline provision,
from its action. Bar Counsel asserted that this exception was limited to a
which was not a factor in Goldberg) and § 18. D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 19(3).
Section 18 is the reciprocal discipline section. A major issue in Goldberg was the determina-
tion of whether the § 19(3) 30 day delay was applicable to reciprocal discipline. Goldberg,
460 A.2d at 984. If so, the rule would necessitate prospective application of the suspension.
37. 460 A.2d at 985. Under the D.C. BAR RULES, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals must review a recommendation of the District of Columbia Board on Professional
Responsibility if timely exceptions are filed by the attorney who is the subject of the action.
D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 7(3).
38. 460 A.2d at 984.
39. Brief for Respondent at 6, Goldberg, 460 A.2d 982 (D.C. 1983).
40. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
41. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 984.
42. Id.
43. Brief for Bar Counsel at 9, Goldberg, 460 A.2d 982 (D.C. 1983). See supra note 36.
44. Brief for Respondent at 6, Goldberg, 460 A.2d 982 (D.C. 1983).
45. Id Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 986 n. I (Kelly, J., dissenting in part); See also supra notes
2-3 and accompanying text.
46. D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 19(3); see supra note 36.
47. D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 18; see supra note 36.
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single provision of section 18 which requires that reciprocal discipline in
the District of Columbia be deferred until the expiration of any stay of
discipline that might have been imposed by the original court.48 The court
held that the thirty day delay in effecting discipline did not apply to recip-
rocal discipline, 9 reasoning that the plain meaning of section 19(3) ex-
cluded section 18 from its action.50 Furthermore, the Goldberg court
applied the principles of statutory construction51 which dictate that, in
resolving alleged conflicts of statutory language, each provision is to be
given its maximum effect so long as doing so does not perpetuate an obvi-
ous mistake.5" The court thus held that interpreting the thirty day delay
requirement as applicable to the reciprocal discipline section would limit
unnecessarily the operation of section 18. 5'
Additionally, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found that the
Bar Counsel's reading of the D.C. Bar Rules created an unnecessary con-
flict. 4 The court held that identical discipline constituted discipline con-
current in time as well as duration, stating that any other result would
increase the punishment beyond that contemplated by the original court. 5
Therefore, the Goldberg court reasoned, interpreting the D.C. Bar Rules
to require a thirty day delay before a reciprocal suspension becomes effec-
tive would result in punishment greater than that imposed by the original
forum.56 This necessarily would conflict with the rule requiring that disci-
48. D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 18(4); see Brief of Bar Counsel at 9 n.2,
Goldberg, 460 A.2d 982 (D.C. 1983).
49. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985.
50. Id at 984. Section 19(3) of Rule XI of the D.C. BAR RULES reads in part: "Except
as provided in § 18 of this rule, orders imposing disbarment or suspension shall be effective
30 days after entry." D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at Rule XI § 19(3).
51. The court recognized that it was interpreting court rules and not statutes. However,
it stated that rules of statutory construction are "commonly used" in interpreting court rules.
Id at 985 n.5 (quoting 3 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 67.10 (4th
ed. 1974)).
52. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985. See 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 46.04 (4th ed. 1973 & Supp. 1983).
53. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985. If the thirty-day delay provision (§ 19(3) the D.C. Bar
Rules) applies to reciprocal discipline, then the reciprocal discipline section (§ 18) must be
read restrictively. If § 19(3) does not apply to § 18, then § 18 may be read more expansively,
so as to allow both retroactive and prospective application. Conversely, interpreting § 19(3)
as exempting only the portion of § 18 regarding stays of discipline in another court (§ 18(4))
restricts the effect of § 19(3), while reading § 19(3) so as to exempt all of § 18 gives the
exemption clause its fullest possible effect.
54. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985.
55. Id The punishment is increased in part because the total time of suspension from




pline be identical.5 7 Consequently, preservation of internal consistency in
the D.C. Bar Rules demanded that no delay be imposed in the reciprocal
discipline situation.
58
The effect of the court's unwillingness to apply the thirty day-after-order
date to reciprocal discipline cases is to render the D.C. Bar Rules silent as
to the effective date of sanctions. The Goldberg court held that, when the
rules are silent, it has discretion to decide the effective date of the sanc-
tion.59 The court's decision that only concurrent discipline was truly iden-
tical discipline in the Goldberg situation prompted the court to exercise its
discretion in favor of a retroactive sanction. 60 Moreover, the court indi-
cated that concurrent identical discipline is the preferred sanction in recip-
rocal discipline cases.6'
57. D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 18(5). See supra note II and accompanying
text.
58. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985.
59. Id. at 983. Exercise of the power to decide the timing of the suspension is consistent
with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' broad power to regulate bar admission and
conduct. The court's power was recognized as early as 1823 in Exparte Burr, 2 D.C. (I
Cranch) 379 (1823) (applying the laws of Maryland as District of Columbia local law). In
Burr, it was held that the court had the power to scrutinize, suspend, or summarily disbar an
attorney. In 1939, the Court of Appeals, in Mullen v. Canfield, 105 F.2d 47, 48 (D.C. Cir.
1939), held that the court which admits an attorney to a bar may also suspend him unless
there exists apparent contrary legislative intent. At the time of Mullen, the authority to disci-
pline members of the District of Columbia Bar was vested in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. In re Keller, 380 A.2d 119, 123-25 (D.C. 1977). The
district court was "guided by, but not limited to" the ABA Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, and operated under no specific standards as to what conduct should be sanctioned. Id
at 123. The present disciplinary system became effective on April 1, 1972. The Court Re-
form and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, passed by the United States Congress, gave the
power to discipline the District of Columbia Bar to the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals, and required the court of appeals to make rules governing bar discipline. Id. at 124.
The plenary authority to discipline lawyers described in Burr and Mullen, however, also has
been held to have passed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals by virtue of the 1970
Act. Id. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2502 (1973); 7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 60 (1980) (the
legislature may confer the power to suspend or disbar on any court).
Some courts have held that the power of the state's highest court is independent of bar
rules. In that regard, statutory provisions have been found to aid the inherent power of the
court rather than to give the court only that power which is confined to the limits of the
statute. See, e.g., In re Feingold, 296 A.2d 491 (Me. 1972); 7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 60
(1980). In Goldberg, the court of appeals did not have to reach the question of whether the
D.C. Bar Rules, promulgated pursuant to the Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of
1970, were merely advisory. The court found itself to be operating in an interstitial space
between provisions of the D.C. Bar Rules. Therefore, its inherent power was declared to be
unfettered. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 983.
60. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985. See supra notes 40, 55 and accompanying text.
61. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985. The court found that its discretionary power to impose
identical discipline was guided by § 18(5) of Rule XI of the D.C. Bar Rules. See supra note
II and accompanying text. The exceptions listed in § 18(5) were suggested as the circum-
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In concluding, the Goldberg court attempted to decide whether
Goldberg's case warranted imposing identical discipline under Rule XI,
section 18(5) of the D.C. Bar Rules.62 The court considered factors arising
from Goldberg's conduct subsequent to the Maryland suspension order
which might mitigate or aggravate the quantum of harm done to the inter-
ests which the District of Columbia seeks to further when it administers
bar discipline. 63 The court stated that Goldberg's alleged voluntary with-
drawal from the practice of law in the District of Columbia constituted an
important mitigating factor militating in favor of retroactive discipline.
Conversely, his continued practice during that period would have been an
aggravating factor, favoring the application of a stronger sanction.64 The
court determined that it could not make a decision regarding the propriety
of identical discipline because the record of the proceeding before the Dis-
trict of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility65 contained no
finding of fact concerning whether Goldberg had actually refrained from
practice in the District of Columbia during his Maryland suspension.66
Therefore, the case was remanded to the Board for further fact finding.67
stances under which greater or lesser sanctions (including, presumably, no reciprocal disci-
pline or nonconcurrent discipline) would be imposed. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985. See infra
notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
63. The court treated § 18(5)(c) of Rule XI of the D.C. Bar Rules as the provision which
allowed for the consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors. Section 18(5)(c) allows
for the application of different discipline when imposition of identical discipline "would
result in grave injustice." Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985 (quoting D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6
at Rule XI § 18(5)(c)). See infra note 103 and accompanying text; see also infra note 81 and
accompanying text (listing the interests of the District of Columbia in imposing bar
discipline).
64. The court also mentioned as a mitigating factor an attorney's prompt notification to
the District of Columbia Bar counsel upon being disciplined in another jurisdiction. Failure
to notify bar counsel was expressed as an aggravating factor. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985.
Goldberg was found to have promptly notified the District of Columbia Bar Counsel of his
Maryland suspension. Id See also infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
66. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985-86.
67. Id On remand the court also allowed the Board to "consider any other evidence
bearing on the question of whether the suspension should be concurrent or consecutive." Id.
The court retained jurisdiction, however, demanding that the case be returned for entry of a
final order. Id at 985-86. Judge Kelly concurred with the court's reasoning, but found the
facts to be sufficient to impose a concurrent reciprocal suspension without remand. Id at
986 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
On remand, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommended to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals a 30-day suspension to run concurrently with Goldberg's long
since expired Maryland suspension. The court so ordered. In re Goldberg, No. M-l 17-82
(D.C. Mar. 30, 1983), 111 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 1159 (July 16, 1983) (order imposing a 30-
day suspension in the District of Columbia, to run from Mar. 25, 1982 to Apr. 24, 1982).
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II. Is CONCURRENT RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE THE MOST IDENTICAL
ALTERNATIVE?
The Goldberg court, in deciding that concurrent suspension constituted
the most nearly identical form of reciprocal discipline, considered only two
of at least four possible sanctions which arguably were identical to the
Maryland discipline. The court limited its considerations to concurrent
suspensions68 and a suspension to become effective thirty days after the
District of Columbia court order.69 Two other possible disciplinary meas-
ures not considered by the court are discipline to become effective immedi-
ately upon court order, and no additional discipline. To determine which
of these four possibilities most nearly constitutes identical discipline, the
yardsticks by which they may be measured-the goals of lawyer disci-
pline-must first be examined.
A. Evaulating the Purpose of Bar Discpline
The District of Columbia Code of Professional Responsibility (D.C.
Code)70 hints at the purposes of attorney discipline only in its preamble,
where it states that "[1]awyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in
the preservation of society."71 The preamble stresses that lawyers have a
responsibility both to the legal system and to the society within which they
function.72 The D.C. Code also states that the disciplinary rules and ethi-
cal considerations embodied in its text express expected standards gov-
erning lawyers' relationships with the public, the legal system, and the
legal profession." Lawyer discipline in the District of Columbia, there-
fore, must be imposed primarily to protect these stated interests.
District of Columbia case law regarding bar discipline reveals an effort
to protect the same interests mentioned in the preamble of the D.C. Code.
Essentially, these interests are to protect the public,74 and to maintain the
68. 460 A.2d at 984.
69. Id at 985.
70. D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at appendix A. For the purposes of this Note, the
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY [hereinafter cited as D.C.
CODE] is identical in all respects to the ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY (1981), except that the D.C. CODE does not incorporate the footnoted material appearing
in the ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE, supra note 26.
71. D.C. CODE, supra note 70, at Preamble.
72. Id. at Preamble and Preliminary Statement.
73. Id at Preliminary Statement. Of importance for Mr. Goldberg, the Preliminary
Statement also says that "[a] lawyer should ultimately be responsible for the conduct of his
employees and associates in the course of the professional representation of the client." Id
74. In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C. 1980); In re Smith, 403 A.2d 296, 300 (D.C.
1979); In re Wild, 361 A.2d 182, 183 (D.C. 1976); District of Columbia Bar v. Kleindienst,
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integrity of the legal profession.75 The case law also adds goals which are
not specifically mentioned in the D.C. Code, such as deterrence of pro-
scribed behavior,76 rehabilitation of the offending lawyer,77 restitution to
harmed clients, 78 and penalizing of the attorney.79 Legal commentators
and the authors of model codes agree with the D.C. Code and the District
of Columbia's case law regarding the purpose of professional discipline
except to the extent that the latter condones punishment as a purpose of
the bar disciplinary system. 0
Distilling the teachings of the commentators, the District of Columbia's
345 A.2d 146, 147 (D.C. 1975) (the purpose of discipline is protection of the public, not the
punishment of the offending lawyer).
75. Haupt, 422 A.2d at 771 and Smith, 403 A.2d at 300 (protection of the courts an
additional purpose of bar discipline); Wild, 361 A.2d at 183 and Kleindienst, 345 A.2d at 150
(need to maintain integrity of profession is a factor in determining rigor of discipline im-
posed). The latter case cites the record of Kleindienst's hearing before the District of Co-
lumbia Board of Professional Responsibility. See generally supra note 34. Kleindienst
excerpts a portion of the Board's record in which the Board identifies the traditional consid-
erations of District of Columbia bar discipline as: protecting the public from incompetent or
unethical lawyers; deterring other lawyers from unprofessional conduct; maintaining public
confidence in the profession; and balancing the three above listed considerations against the
seriousness of the impact that disciplinary action will have on the life of the punished
lawyer.
76. Wild, 361 A.2d at 183-84 (implies that punishment is also a consideration in impos-
ing discipline); Kleindienst, 345 A.2d at 147 (cites as a purpose of discipline deterrence by
making an example of the sanctioned lawyer).
77. Kleindienst, 345 A.2d at 148.
78. Haupt, 422 A.2d at 771; Smith, 403 A.2d at 303.
79. Smith, 403 A.2d at 303; Kleindienst, 345 A.2d at 149-52 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (pun-
ishment is an unavoidable purpose and is not objectionable when not the primary purpose).
See Charlton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903 (D.C. 1976) ("disbarment [is] designed to protect the
public [and] is [a] punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer").
80. See, e.g., R. ARONSON & D. WECKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A NUT-
SHELL 42 (1980) (the purpose of professional sanctions is to protect the public, not to punish
the lawyer); id. at 44-45 (a purpose of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility is
to maintain public confidence; discipline should be designed to prevent future violations
rather than to punish vindictively); id. at 50-51 (discipline may be increased in the interest of
deterrence of other lawyers from engaging in the same conduct; protection of the public and
of the administration of justice should determine the degree of the sanction imposed); Steele
& Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.
917, 999-1014 (The current goals of bar discipline include: cleansing the bar of unethical
lawyers, deterring unethical conduct, and preserving the profession's public image. The au-
thors' suggested goals of bar discipline include: setting norms for proper ethical behavior,
managing attorney-client disputes by setting standards, and supervising the bar administra-
tively to shape behavior.).
The ABA's DISCIPLINARY STANDARDS, supra note 4, although not specifically adopted by
the District of Columbia, are also helpful in assessing the proper purpose of sanctions. The
ABA DISCIPLINARY STANDARDS state that discipline should be designed to maintain appro-
priate professional conduct. Id. at Standard II. Maintenance of appropriate conduct would
serve the function of protecting both the public and the judicial system. The ABA DISCIPLI-
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case law, and the D.C. Code, the goals of bar discipline in the District of
Columbia may be summarized as follows:
1. To protect the public from unfit lawyers;
2. To protect the judicial system from corruption by unfit lawyers;
3. To maintain appropriate standards for the profession;
4. To maintain public confidence in the profession;
5. To deter lawyers from committing breaches of professional ethics;
and
6. To punish offending lawyers.8 1
B. Evaluating the Effect of the Alternative Forms of Reciprocal Discipline
A comparison of the four alternative methods of applying arguably
identical sanctions reveals which one would best effectuate the purposes of
the disciplinary system in a case such as Goldberg. The District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals could conceivably apply any of the four methods of
imposing discipline identical to a suspension originally ordered by another
jurisdiction. These alternatives are: no additional discipline in the District
of Columbia; a suspension of equal length to be applied retroactively so as
to run concurrently with the foreign suspension; a suspension to become
effective immediately upon order of the District of Columbia court; and
suspension to become effective thirty days after order of the court.82
. No Further Discipline Constitutes Lighter than Identical Discipline
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland consid-
ered Goldberg's case and decided not to impose any discipline in addition
to that already meted out by the Maryland Court of Appeals. 3 Goldberg
claimed not to have practiced law in any federal or state court while sus-
NARY STANDARDS also state that punishment is not a purpose of professional discipline. Id.
at Standard 1.1 and commentary.
A slightly different, but still valid, aim of professional sanctions was expressed by the 1908
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. The Canons referred to the maintenance of public
confidence in the legal profession. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908) at Preamble.
See Kleindienst, 345 A.2d at 150 (maintenance of the public confidence is a relevant consid-
eration for determining bar discipline in the District of Columbia).
81. Punishment was included as a goal because it seemed impossible to remove it as a
motive. See, e.g., Wild, 361 A.2d at 183-84; but see, e.g., Kleindienst, 345 A.2d at 147 (disbar-
ment should not be considered punishment); ABA DISCIPLINARY STANDARDS, supra note 4,
at Standard 1.1 and commentary.
82. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. This Note considers the last two
alternatives together since their practical effect is the same.
83. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 986 n. 1. An attorney does not automatically lose his right to
practice in federal court even when disbarred by the highest court of the state in which the
federal court sits. See supra note 1.
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pended by the Maryland Bar. 4 If the District of Columbia adopted the
Maryland district court's approach, the public and the legal system would
have been protected from a continuation of Goldberg's unprofessional ac-
tivities if, in fact, Goldberg had not practiced in the District of Columbia
during his Maryland suspension. However, a decision of record in which
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals refrained from imposing disci-
pline would undermine the standards of the legal profession as well as
public confidence in the profession. It would also fail to deter lawyers
from committing future breaches of the disciplinary rules. The decision
could be interpreted by the public and the bar as condoning the behavior,
or at the very least, as not condemning it.
The District of Columbia's failure to impose its own discipline would
not constitute identical discipline. Its discipline would be lighter than that
imposed by the Maryland court. The Maryland suspension amounted to
public recognition of the wrongfulness of Goldberg's action. If the District
of Columbia declined to impose further discipline, there would be no rec-
ognition of Goldberg's wrongdoing in the District. The seriousness of ac-
knowledging an attorney's wrongdoing cannot be over emphasized. 5
Thus, at least a pro forma suspension by the District of Columbia is neces-
sary for ensuring that its discipline is equal to that imposed by Maryland.
2. Concurrent Suspension Constitutes Identical Discpline
The concurrent reciprocal suspension suggested by the Goldberg court,
involving public recognition of the attorney's wrongdoing through an or-
der suspending the offender, would result in the most nearly identical form
of discipline that the District of Columbia could apply. By issuing such a
disciplinary order, the District of Columbia would add the necessary pub-
licity to the no-further-discipline approach. Concurrent reciprocal disci-
pline maintains public confidence in the legal system by virtue of the
court's imposition of punishment for wrongdoing. Additionally, imposi-
tion of discipline helps to deter other lawyers from unprofessional activi-
ties, thereby aiding in the maintenance of the standards of the legal
profession.
In Goldberg, District of Columbia Bar Counsel argued that concurrent
suspension was not a sufficient punishment because the respondent en-
joyed all the rights and privileges of an attorney in the District of Colum-
84. See Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985.
85. The Preamble to the D.C. CODE, supra note 70, states that the prospect of losing the




bia during his Maryland suspension.86 Additionally, Bar Counsel argued
that Goldberg's suspension of practice was not a form of discipline because
the withdrawal was voluntary.87 It is difficult to understand, however,
what privileges Goldberg could have enjoyed. Indeed, under Maryland
law, he could not have practiced in the District of Columbia as long as his
office was located in Maryland.88 It is true that Goldberg could have exer-
cised the privilege of holding himself out as an attorney in good standing
in the District of Columbia during his Maryland suspension. This privi-
lege, however, would have been meaningless since Goldberg could not
have actually practiced without violating Maryland's rules. Further,
whatever status Goldberg enjoyed from knowing that he was an attorney
in good standing in the District of Columbia would be dashed by imposing
retroactive discipline.
Admittedly, an order for retroactive discipline would not obviate the
fact that Goldberg was allowed to claim membership, albeit without prac-
ticing, in the District of Columbia bar after his Maryland discipline, but
the benefit of this temporarily unblemished standing is ephemeral at best.
It is also a benefit which cannot be removed by either prospective or retro-
active action, since it was enjoyed before the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals could hear the case. Additionally, imposition of a prospective
suspension in an attempt to compensate for the period of time in which
Goldberg was a titular member of the District of Columbia bar after his
Maryland suspension would have a primarily punitive effect from which
neither the public nor the bar would benefit. Goldberg's inactivity served
to protect the public and the court system from potential unprofessional
conduct even though his withdrawal was voluntary.
3. Suspension Imposed After Order of the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals Constitutes Harsher than Identical Discipline
District of Columbia Bar Counsel's brief for the case In Re Berger,89
which was filed after the Goldberg brief,9" departs from the position taken
86. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 986.
87. Id In reality, Goldberg's withdrawal from practice in the District of Columbia was
not essentially voluntary, since he was under the impression that such withdrawal was man-
dated by Maryland law. Id MD. ANN. CODE, art. 10, § 1 (1976); 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 43 (Md.
1976).
88. See 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 43 (Md. 1976).
89. Bar Counsel's Response to Suggestion that Reciprocal Discipline of Suspension be
Imposed Retroactively, In re Berger, No. M-125-82 (D.C. 1982).
90. Bar Counsel's Goldberg brief was filed on Aug. 10, 1982. The Berger brief was filed
on Nov. 8, 1982. Bar Counsel's Supplemental Memorandum, In re Berger, No. M-125-82
(D.C. 1982). Berger had been suspended from the practice of law in Arizona for six months,
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by Bar Counsel in Goldberg.91 In the Berger brief, Bar Counsel argued
that reciprocal discipline cases were exempted from the rule requiring sus-
pension to become effective thirty days after the court's order.92 Bar
Counsel urged that this exception was meant to allow suspensions to be-
come effective immediately upon the court's order. 93 This argument im-
plied that the thirty-day provision, which specifically contemplated use of
the period between the issuance of the order and its effective date as an
opportunity to wind down business,94 was unnecessary in reciprocal disci-
pline cases because the process already contained a built-in delay of ap-
proximately sixty days.95
The Berger argument also leaves imposition of discipline to the court's
discretion because, like the Goldberg decision, it stands for the proposition
that reciprocal discipline cases are exempted from the thirty-day delay
rule. It simply gives the court a rationale for imposing immediate disci-
pline. In practice, it makes little difference whether the reciprocal suspen-
sion begins immediately upon the forum court's order or thirty days
thereafter. Either an immediate or a thirty-day delay of the District of
Columbia suspension would, as the court pointed out,9 6 increase the total
discipline imposed. Nonconcurrent discipline is especially punitive in a
situation like Goldberg's, in which the suspension in the original jurisdic-
tion has run its course. Nonconcurrent discipline would force a lawyer
once again to call clients with confidence-shattering news,97 to reschedule
from Dec. 7, 1981 through June 7, 1982, for charging excessive fees. In re Berger, 87 A.D.2d
92, 450 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). An identical concurrent suspension was
imposed by New York on May 17, 1982. Id. at 209-10. The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals specifically followed Goldberg in imposing upon Berger an identical concurrent sus-
pension. In re Berger, No. M-125-82 (D.C. Apr. 1, 1983) (order imposing suspension from
the District of Columbia Bar from Dec. 7, 1981 through June 7, 1982).
91. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
92. Bar Counsel's Response to Suggestion that Reciprocal Discipline of Suspension be
Imposed Retroactively, supra note 89, at 8.
93. Id.
94. "[Dluring the period between the entry date of the order and its effective date [the
disciplined attorney] may wind up and complete, on behalf of any client, all matters which
were pending on the entry date." D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 19(3). See 7A C.J.S.
Attorney & Client § 120 nn.86, 87 and accompanying text (1980 & Supp. 1983) (disciplined
attorney must make arrangements to have clients' work continued).
95. Bar Counsel's Response to Suggestion that Reciprocal Discipline of Suspension be
Imposed Retroactively, supra note 89, at 2.
96. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985; See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
97. Jurisdictions such as Maryland and the District of Columbia are economically inter-
dependent to a great degree. Many lawyers have clients in both jurisdictions. An attorney
who is suspended in Maryland and voluntarily withdraws from practice in the District of
Columbia for the same period of time would be required to notify his clients in the District
of Columbia of his withdrawal. See supra note 94. If, after the Maryland suspension had
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cases, and to arrange for coverage of clients' needs by other lawyers. If the
"possible loss of . . .respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction, '98
the lawyer would have been sanctioned twice. That is not identical pun-
ishment, but additional punishment.
III. CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF
APPLYING IDENTICAL RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE IN A SPECIFIC
CASE: MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING FACTORS
As discussed earlier,99 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Goldberg based its analysis of identical discipline on section 18(5) of the
D.C. Bar Rules, which requires application of identical discipline except in
five specified situations."°° These exceptions are as follows:
a. When there has been lack of due process in the original forum;' 0 '
b. When there has been a clear infirmity of proof in the original
forum;
10 2
c. When imposing identical discipline in the District of Columbia
would constitute grave injustice;
10 3
d. When the misconduct elsewhere warrants substantially different dis-
cipline in the District of Columbia; ° and,
e. When the misconduct elsewhere does not constitute misconduct in
the District of Columbia.'0 5
Assume a situation in which the original forum accorded the defendant
due process and made its findings of fact based on adequate proof. Fur-
ther assume that the original forum has disciplinary rules which proscribe
the same sort of conduct proscribed in the District of Columbia."° Given
these assumptions, the only exceptions under D.C. Bar Rule XI that could
result in the imposition of a different degree of discipline are situations in
which identical discipline in the District of Columbia would constitute a
run its course, the attorney were forced to call the clients again because a second suspension
had been imposed upon the lawyer nonretroactively in the District of Columbia, they might
believe that the attorney had committed additional disciplinary violations.
98. See D.C. CODE, supra note 70 at preamble.
99. See supra notes 40-42, 63 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 9-14, 63 and accompanying text.
101. D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 18(5)(a). See text of rule, supra note 9.
102. Id at § 18(5)(b). See text of rule, supra note 10.
103. Id. at § 18(5)(c). See text of rule, supra note 12.
104. Id. at § 18(5)(d). See text of rule, supra note 13
105. Id at § 18(5)(e). See text of rule, supra note 14
106. As previously noted, for practical purposes, the MARYLAND CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY is identical to the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY. See supra note 26.
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grave injustice, or in which the misconduct in the original forum would
warrant substantially different discipline in the District of Columbia.' °7
Such situations would arise either when the District of Columbia attaches
substantially different punishment to the same violation, or when the of-
fending attorney has done something after the original adjudication which
calls for the imposition of different punishment at the time that the District
of Columbia passes judgment.
The Goldberg court found none of the situations contemplated in the
rule XI exceptions to be present regarding the Maryland decision.
0 8
However, the court was unwilling to apply the same discipline without
remanding to determine whether developments occurring between the
time of the Maryland decision and the time of the District of Columbia
order had changed the appropriateness of applying identical discipline.' 9
In remanding the case, the court was concerned that circumstances occur-
ring in the interim might have warranted different discipline in the Dis-
trict" o or given rise to some situation which would result in a grave
injustice if the court imposed identical discipline."'
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals identified two factors which
could aggravate 2 the situation and cause imposition of a harsher disci-
pline.' 3 These aggravating factors were a lawyer's unreasonable delay in
notifying the District of Columbia Bar Counsel of his having been disci-
plined in another jurisdiction, and a lawyer's practicing law in the District
107. Section 18(5)(c) excepts identical reciprocal discipline which would result in a grave
injustice. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Section 18(5)(d) excepts identical recip-
rocal discipline when the misconduct elsewhere warrants a substantially different sanction in
the District of Columbia. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. In Goldberg, the court
applied §§ 18(5)(c) and (d) of Rule XI of the D.C. BAR RULES to determine whether the
circumstances surrounding Goldberg's suspension in Maryland and his averred withdrawal
from practice for the same period of time in the District of Columbia warranted the applica-
tion of identical discipline in the District. 460 A.2d at 985.
108. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 984.
109. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985-86. The court noted there were no findings by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility as to whether Goldberg voluntarily
refrained from practice in the District of Columbia during his Maryland suspension, and
remanded for such a finding in order that the appropriate sanction be imposed. Id The
court also indicated that harsher discipline would be appropriate if Goldberg had not
promptly notified the District of Columbia Bar Counsel of his Maryland discipline. Id at
985.
110. Id at 985-86. See D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 18(5)(d).
11l. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985-86. See D.C. BAR RULES, supra note 6, at § 18(5)(c). The
court also cited § 18(5)(d) to hold open the possibility of applying different discipline in
future cases in which the original jurisdiction considers appropriate substantially different
discipline than does the District of Columbia. 460 A.2d at 985.




of Columbia while being suspended elsewhere." 14 The converse of these
behaviors was viewed by the court as mitigating factors.' 15
Both the District of Columbia case law and legal commentators tradi-
tionally have held that aggravating and mitigating factors should be taken
into account in dispensing disciplinary sanctions." 6 In identifying two
mitigating factors which are consistent with those traditionally recog-
nized,' 1' the Goldberg court revealed a willingness to examine aggravating
and mitigating circumstances before deciding whether discipline identical
to that imposed on an attorney by a foreign jurisdiction is appropriate.
Application of this reasoning to all reciprocal discipline cases would make
uniform the standards to be applied in determining the proper sanctions
for a given violation of the disciplinary rules, whether the violation oc-
curred in the District of Columbia or elsewhere. Such a result would pro-
mote truly fair application of reciprocal discipline." 8
114. Id
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., In re Haupt, 522 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C. 1980) (disregard for clients was an
aggravating factor); see also In re Dedman, 17 Cal. 3d 229, 550 P.2d 1040, 1042-43, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 504, (1976) (efforts to ensure that violations would cease, good behavior before and
since disciplinary action, and the seeking of psychiatric treatment were mitigating factors);
In re Kaufman, 81 N.J. 300, 406 A.2d 972, 973 (1979) (failure to settle accounts of neglected
clients, even after suspension in the original jurisdiction, was an aggravating factor); In re
Ritger, 80 N.J. 1, 401 A.2d 1094, 1095 (1979) (lack of contrition and failure to reimburse
wronged parties were aggravating factors; prior unblemished record, making full restitution
and agreement to future employment only with proper supervision were mitigating factors);
In re Miller, 68 A.D.2d 544, 418 N.Y.S.2d 69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (74 years of age, long
blameless service record, complete restitution, and attorney's already serving a suspension to
which time was added were mitigating factors); see also 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 52
(1980 & Supp. 1983) (mitigating factors are to be considered in deciding the severity of the
sanction to be imposed); 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client §§ 116(a) n.79-91, 116(b) (1980 & Supp.
1983); Annot., 95 A.L.R.3d 724 (1979 & Supp. 1983) (restitution to client of misappropriated
funds is a mitigating factor); Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 1061, 1091 (1979 & Supp. 1983) (delay in
prosecution of disciplinary proceeding is a mitigating factor); Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 739
(1964) (mental disturbance at the time of lawyer's unethical conduct is mitigating factor).
117. See supra notes 61-64, 109 and accompanying text; see also infra note 118.
118. The traditionally recognized mitigating and aggravating factors considered in im-
posing bar discipline are listed in the ABA DISCIPLINARY STANDARDS, supra note 4, at Stan-
dard 7.1 and commentary. The Standards state that:
The respondent's lack of remorse, his failure to cooperate with the . . . investi-
gation, his failure to voluntarily make [sic] restitution to those injured by his mis-
conduct, his failure to acknowledge and recognize the seriousness of his
violation . . . and his record of prior discipline, are factors which have been
viewed as "aggravating" . ...
A willingness to rectify the damage caused by the misconduct, contrition,
inexperience, temporary mental aberrations for which the respondent has sought
treatment, and restitution prior to the filing of a grievance, have been relied upon
by courts as mitigating factors warranting lesser discipline.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Goldberg court correctly decided that the only way to impose truly
identical discipline upon a lawyer suspended in another jurisdiction who
has voluntarily refrained from practice in the District of Columbia during
that suspension is to impose a retroactive concurrent suspension. In this
way both jurisdictions equally serve the disciplinary goals of bar sanctions.
Moreover, the public is protected from the lawyer's unprofessional practice
through his absence from practice in each jurisdiction for an equal amount
of time. The confidence of the public in each bar is maintained in equal
measure by public announcements of suspensions of equal terms. Essen-
tially all of the goals of lawyer disciplinary proceedings are achieved by
the two disciplinary steps taken together." 9 Additionally, retroactive con-
current discipline is the least punitive, and therefore the fairest method of
accomplishing these goals.
Goldberg also gave guidance as to when identical discipline should and
should not be imposed. The court wisely held that, in the absence of ag-
gravating or mitigating factors, concurrent suspension will be warranted.
In suggesting how to determine whether such factors exist, the court hinted
that the District of Columbia, in order to determine whether identical dis-
cipline is appropriate in any given case, may apply those aggravating or
mitigating factors it has used in the past to decide the severity of sanctions
to be imposed. If the District of Columbia Court of Appeals follows this
Prior to the District of Columbia court hearing, Goldberg had allegedly replaced his sec-
retary, restored the funds to the escrow account, and otherwise attempted to rectify his deal-
ings with clients. Maryland v. Goldberg, 441 A.2d at 339, 341, 342. Goldberg had fully
cooperated with the District of Columbia authorities and had refrained voluntarily from
practice in the District. Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 984, 986. He had acknowledged his violation
and shown contrition. Id. at 984; Maryland v. Goldberg, 441 A.2d at 339, 342. He was
found to have been unaware of his secretary's activities until he caught and fired her. His
past record was good in that he had always been considered competent prior to this proceed-
ing, and Maryland Bar Counsel had recommended that his punishment be limited to a repri-
mand. Maryland v. Goldberg, 441 A.2d at 339, 342. Nothing appeared in the record which
reasonably could have been considered to be an aggravating factor. Therefore, it appears
that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would not be justified in imposing a second
suspension in the District, a sanction too harsh to be called identical discipline. See
Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985.
On remand, the District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility recommended
a concurrent reciprocal suspension. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals ordered the
suspension recommended by the Board. In re Goldberg, No. M-1 17-82 (D.C. Mar. 30, 1983)
(order suspending Goldberg from practice for 30 days nunc pro tunc to run concurrently
with suspension in Maryland, March 25 to April 24, 1982).
119. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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guidance, the result will be a fair determination of the appropriate recipro-
cal bar discipline.
C Stephen Lawrence

